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Abstract—Gaussian random attacks that jointly minimize the
amount of information obtained by the operator from the grid
and the probability of attack detection are presented. The con-
struction of the attack is posed as an optimization problem with
a utility function that captures two effects: firstly, minimizing
the mutual information between the measurements and the state
variables; secondly, minimizing the probability of attack detection
via the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the distribution of
the measurements with an attack and the distribution of the
measurements without an attack. Additionally, a lower bound
on the utility function achieved by the attacks constructed with
imperfect knowledge of the second order statistics of the state
variables is obtained. The performance of the attack construction
using the sample covariance matrix of the state variables is
numerically evaluated. The above results are tested in the IEEE
30-Bus test system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid is expected to address the challenges posed
by the move towards decentralized renewable energy gen-
eration. At the core of the smart grid lies an advanced
sensing and communication network embedded in the electric
power grid that provides the cyber backbone for the emerging
cyberphysical energy system. The resulting system is expected
to operate more efficiently while addressing some of the
stability and resilience issues such as the ones causing the
2003 North American outage [1]. While the increased sensing
and communication enables the implementation of advanced
control and management procedures, the cyber layer also
opens the door to malicious attacks. The cybersecurity threats
to which the smart grid is exposed are not well understood
yet, and therefore, practical security solutions need to come
forth as a multidisciplinary effort combining technologies such
as cryptography, advanced machine learning, and information-
theoretic security [2].
Data injection attacks (DIAs) [3], which exploit the sensing
infrastructure used in state estimation by the network operator,
are an immediate concern. DIA strategies involve corrupting
the estimate that the operator obtains of the state of the grid
by tampering with the measurements produced by the sensing
infrastructure. In [3] unobservable attacks are proposed for
the case in which the operator performs least squares (LS)
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estimation. The case in which the attacker has access to a
limited number of sensors is analyzed in [4], [5] and [6].
Therein it is shown that the attacker can circumvent the access
constraints using an `1-minimization approach to construct a
sparse attack vector. This approach is extended to the case
in which multiple attackers control a subset of the nodes of
the grid and coordinate to distributely construct unobservable
attacks [7] and [8].
Bayesian frameworks are considered for transmission grids
in [9] and [10] and for distribution grids in [11] by assuming
a multivariate Gaussian distribution for the state variables. In
this case the operator performs minimum mean square error
(MMSE) estimation. Two attack constructions that tradeoff
the distortion introduced in the estimates with the probability
of attack detection are presented in [9]. Maximum MMSE
distortion attacks and their construction in a decentralized
game-theoretic setting are studied in [10]. Within an AC state
estimation setting partial knowledge of the state variables is
used to create unobservable attacks in [12].
The introduction of a probabilistic description of the state
variables enables using information measures in the analysis
of state estimation problems. For instance, a sensor place-
ment strategy that accounts for the amount of information
acquired by the sensing infrastructure is studied in [13].
Information-theoretic security tools are employed to provide
privacy guarantees in systems with smart meters [14], [15]
and [16]. However, information-theoretic security in a smart
grid state estimation context is still not well understood. In
this paper, the attack construction is studied in terms of
information measures to quantify the information loss that
the attack causes to the operator and the probability of attack
detection. The utility function that arises is analyzed in [17]
in the context of stealth communications. Using this utility
function an optimal Gaussian attack construction is obtained.
The impact of imperfect second order statistics is analyzed by
considering a sample covariance estimate of the state variables
as the available prior knowledge for the attacker.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows.
Section II presents a Bayesian system model for state esti-
mation with linearized system dynamics. A stealthy attack
construction based on an information-theoretic performance
measure is proposed in Section III. The impact of imperfect
second order statistics obtained via a limited training data set
is discussed in Section IV. Section V numerically evaluates the
performance of the proposed attack strategy on the IEEE 30-
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Bus test system. The paper ends with conclusions in Section
VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Bayesian Framework for State Estimation
Linearized system dynamics are considered for the state
estimation problem. The resulting observation model is given
by
YM = HXN + ZM , (1)
where XN ∈ RN is a vector of random variables describing
the true state of the system; H ∈ RM×N is the Jacobian of
the linearized system dynamics which is determined by the
power network topology and the admittances of the branches;
YM ∈ RM is a vector of random variables containing the
measurements available to the attacker; and ZM ∈ RM is
the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) introduced by the
measurements [18], [19], i.e. the vector of random variables
ZM follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2IM ).
The state variables are also assumed to follow a multivariate
Gaussian distribution denoted by
XN ∼ N (0,ΣXX), (2)
where ΣXX is the covariance matrix of the state variables.
Consequently, from (1), the measurement vector also follows
a multivariate Gaussian distribution given by
YM ∼ N (0,ΣYY ), (3)
where ΣYY = HΣXXHT +σ2IM is the covariance matrix of
the measurements.
Given the stochastic nature of the state variables, it is
reasonable for the attacker to pursue a stochastic attack con-
struction strategy. The performance of the attack is therefore
assessed in terms of the average performance that is achieved
with multiple attack realizations. In the following, an attack
vector independent of the state variables is constructed follow-
ing a multivariate Gaussian distribution denoted by
AM ∼ N (0,ΣAA), (4)
where ΣAA is the covariance matrix of the attack vector. It is
worth noting that the independence of the attack vector with
respect to the state variables implies that the attacker does not
need to know the joint distribution of the state variables and
the measurements to construct the attack vector. Knowledge
of the second order moments of the state variables and the
variance of the AWGN introduced by the observation process
suffices to construct the attack. This assumption significantly
reduces the difficulty of the attack construction.
The resulting observation model for the case in which the
measurements are compromised is given by
YMA = HX
N + ZM +AM , (5)
where AM ∈ RM is the attack vector [3]. The compromised
measurements, YMA , follow a multivariate Gaussian distribu-
tion described as
YMA ∼ N (0,ΣYAYA), (6)
where ΣYAYA = HΣXXH
T + σ2IM + ΣAA.
The operator utilizes the measurements obtained from the
grid to detect the presence of an attack. The attack detection
problem is cast into a hypothesis testing problem with hy-
potheses
H0 : YM ∼ N (0,ΣYAYA), versus (7)
H1 : YM ∼ N (0,ΣYY ). (8)
The Neyman-Pearson Lemma [20] states that for a fixed
Type I probability of error, the likelihood ratio test achieves
the minimum Type II probability of error β, when compared
with any other tests with an equal or smaller Type I probability
of error α. In view of this, a likelihood ratio test is chosen as
the attack detection strategy. The likelihood ratio test between
H0 and H1 takes the following form
L(y) =
fYMA (y)
fYM (y)
H0
≷
H1
τ, (9)
where y ∈ RM is a realization of the vector of random
variables modelling the measurements, fYMA and fYM denote
the probability density functions of YMA and Y
M , respectively,
and τ is the decision threshold set by the operator to meet the
false alarm constraint.
B. Information-Theoretic Setting
The aim of the attacker when tampering with the mea-
surements is twofold: first, to minimize the information that
the operator acquires about the state variables from the grid
measurements; second, to minimize the probability of the
attack being detected by the operator. Capitalizing on the
Bayesian framework, an information-theoretic criterion for the
attack construction is adopted. To satisfy the first objective,
the attacker minimizes the mutual information between the
state variables and the compromised measurements. Specif-
ically, the attacker constructs the attack vector, i.e. chooses
the distribution of the attack vector, in such a way that it
minimizes I(XN ;YMA ). This is equivalent to guaranteeing that
the amount of information that the operator acquires about the
state variables X by observing Y is minimized.
On the other hand, the probability of attack detection is
determined by the detection threshold τ and the distribution
induced by the attack on the measurements. Larger values
of τ yield lower probability of detection. The Chernoff-Stein
Lemma [21] states that the logarithm of the averaged minimum
value of Type II probability of error β for any Type I probabil-
ity of error α smaller than one half asymptotically converges to
the inverse of the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between
the distributions of the two hypotheses. Specifically, in this
Bayesian framework, for any  ∈ (0, 1/2),
lim
n→∞
1
n
log βn = −D(PYMA ||PYM ), (10)
where βn is the minimum β for α <  when n M -dimensional
samples are available and D(·||·) is the KL divergence. There-
fore, for the attacker, minimizing the asymptotic detection
probability is equivalent to minimizing D(PYMA ||PYM ), where
PYMA and PYM denote the probability distributions of Y
M
A
and YM , respectively. The minimization of the KL divergence
ensures that the effect of the attack on the induced distribution
over the measurements is minimized, i.e. the attack is stealthy
[17].
In this information-theoretic setting, the attacker minimizes
I(XN ;YMA ) and D(PYMA ||PYM ) simultaneously. The stealthy
attack construction strategy is introduced in the next section.
III. STEALTHY INFORMATION-THEORETIC ATTACKS
A. Stealthy Attacks
Following the approach in [17], the attacker constructs the
utility function I(XN ;YMA ) +D(PYMA ||PYM ) for the attack.
The attacker minimizes this utility function to disrupt the
estimation and bypass the detection of the operator. Note that,
I(XN ;YMA ) +D(PYMA ||PYM ) = D(PXNYMA ||PXNPYM ) ,(11)
where PXNYMA is the joint distribution of (X
N , YMA ). Note
also that the state variables and the compromised measure-
ments follow a multivariate Gaussian distribution given by
(XN , YMA ) ∼ N (0,Σ), (12)
where the block covariance matrix has following structure:
Σ =
[
ΣXX ΣXXH
T
HΣXX HΣXXH
T + σ2IM + ΣAA
]
. (13)
In view of this, the minimization of I(XN ;YMA ) +
D(PYMA ||PYM ) is posed as the following optimization prob-
lem:
min
AM
D(PXNYMA ||PXNPYM ). (14)
B. Optimal Attack Construction
Proposition 1. [21] The KL divergence between two
M -dimensional multivariate Gaussian distributions P0 =
N (0,Σ0) and P1 = N (0,Σ1) is given by
D(P0||P1) =1
2
(
log
|Σ1|
|Σ0| −M + tr(Σ
−1
1 Σ0)
)
. (15)
Combining (15) and (14) it follows that the optimization
problem in (14) is equivalent to
min
ΣAA∈SM+
[
tr(Σ−1YY ΣAA)− log |ΣAA + σ2IM |
]
, (16)
where SM+ is the set of all M × M positive semi-definite
matrices.
Proposition 2. The optimization problem given by (16) is
equivalent to minimizing a convex function within a convex
set.
Proof. The trace operator is a linear operator, and
− log |ΣAA+σ2IM | is a convex function of the positive semi-
definite matrix ΣAA [22]. Therefore, the objective function in
(16) is a convex function of ΣAA. Since SM+ forms a convex
set, the result follows immediately.
Theorem 1. The solution to the attack construction optimiza-
tion problem (16) is the covariance matrix Σ?AA = HΣXXH
T.
Proof. Taking the derivative of the objective function (16) with
respect to ΣAA yields [23]
∂
(
tr(Σ−1YY ΣAA)− log |ΣAA + σ2IM |
)
∂ΣAA
= 2Σ−1YY − diag(Σ−1YY )
−2(ΣAA + σ2IM )−1 + diag(ΣAA + σ2IM )−1. (17)
Notice that the only critical point is Σ?AA = HΣXXH
T. The
result follows immediately from combining this result with
Proposition 2.
Interestingly, the optimal attack construction depends only
on the second order moments of the state variables. Therefore,
the historical data of the state variables is central to the attack
construction. From a practical point of view, making historical
data and the topology of the grid available to the attacker
poses a security thread to the operator. However, the extent
to which historical data aids the attack construction remains
to be determined. In fact, due to practical and operational
constraints, it is safe to assume that the attacker gets access to
only partial information about the second order statistics of the
state variables. In the next section, the attack performance is
assessed when finite training data is available to the attacker.
IV. ATTACK CONSTRUCTION WITH IMPERFECT SECOND
ORDER STATISTICS
In the following, the case in which only a limited number of
realizations of the state variables are available to the attacker
for covariance estimation is considered. Given that the attack
construction depends only on the second order moments of
the state variables, it suffices for the attacker to estimate the
covariance matrix of the state variables using training samples.
Since there is no other information available, it is assumed
that the attacker estimates the covariance matrix via a sample
covariance matrix construction.
A. Sample Covariance Matrix
Given a set of training data {XNi }Ki=1 of K realizations of
the state variables, the sample covariance matrix is given by
SXX =
1
K − 1
K∑
i=1
XNi (X
N
i )
T, (18)
where K is the number of samples and XNi ∈ RN is the i-th
training sample of the state variables. The sample covariance
matrix SXX coverges asymptotically to the covariance matrix
ΣXX and is a positive semi-definite matrix with probability
1 when K ≥ N [24]. Due to the randomness of the training
samples {XNi }Ki=1, the resulting sample covariance estimate,
SXX , is a random matrix with distribution PSXX .
When the attacker needs to estimate the statistical structure
of the state variables, instead of the optimal attack with
covariance matrix Σ?AA = HΣXXH
T, the attacker constructs
an attack with the sample covariance matrix. Conditioned on
the training data, the resulting attack vector is
A˜M ∼ N (0,ΣA˜A˜), (19)
where ΣA˜A˜ = HSXXH
T. With these estimated statistics, the
KL divergence in (14) conditioned on the covariance matrix
obtained from the training data becomes
D(PXNYM
A˜
|SXX ||QXNYM |PSXX ), (20)
where PXNYM
A˜
|SXX is the conditional joint distribution of
(XN , YM
A˜
) with ΣA˜A˜=HSXXH
T and QXNYM = PXNPYM .
B. Lower Bound on Conditional KL Divergence
The following lemma shows that the objective function in
(14) for exact statistics is a lower bound on the KL divergence
conditioned on the training data given by (20).
Lemma 1. The conditional divergence in (20) for the at-
tack vector construction with covariance ΣA˜A˜ = HSXXH
T
is lower bounded by the divergence in (14) with Σ?AA =
HΣXXH
T, that is
D(PXNYM
A˜
|SXX ||QXNYM |PSXX ) ≥ D(PXNYMA∗ ||PXNPYM ),
(21)
where PXNYM
A∗
is the joint distribution of (XN , YMA∗ ) when
the optimal attack is constructed.
Proof. We have that
D(PXNYM
A˜
|SXX ||QXNYM |PSXX )
= D(PXNYM
A˜
|SXX ||QXNYM |SXX |PSXX ) (22)
= ESXX [D(PXNYM
A˜
|SXX=S ||QXNYM |SXX=S)] (23)
=
1
2
ESXX [tr(Σ−1YY ΣA˜A˜)]−
1
2
ESXX [log |ΣA˜A˜ + σ2IM |]
−1
2
log |Σ−1YY | (24)
≥ 1
2
tr(Σ−1YY Σ
?
AA)−
1
2
log |Σ?AA + σ2IM | −
1
2
log |Σ−1YY | (25)
= D(PXNYM
A?
||PXNPYM ), (26)
where (22) follows from the independence of X and Y with
respect to SXX and (25) follows from Jensen’s inequality and
the fact that − log |V| is a convex function of V ∈ SM+ .
Lemma 1 shows that the KL divergence achieved by the
attack conditioned on the training data is higher than the
performance of the attack construction with exact statistics.
However, the performance of the attack constructed by the
sample covariance matrix converges asymptotically in K to
that of the attack constructed by the exact covariance matrix.
The speed of convergence is numerically evaluated in the
following section.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The IEEE 30-Bus test system is used to simulate the DC
state estimation setting in which the bus voltage magnitudes
are set to 1.0 per unit. As a result, the state estimate is obtained
using the bus injections and load consumption measurements.
The Jacobian matrix H is determined by the branch reactances
of the grid and it is computed using MATPOWER [25].
The optimal attack construction in Theorem 1 shows that the
covariance matrix of the attack is a function of the covariance
matrix of the state variables. To simplify the simulation, a
specific Toeplitz matrix with exponential decay parameter ρ is
adopted [10]. The Toeplitz matrix of dimension N ×N with
exponential decay parameter ρ is given by ΣXX = [sij =
ρ|i−j|; i, j = 1, 2, . . . , N ]. In this setting, the utility function
of the optimal attack is a function of the correlation strength
ρ and the noise variance σ2. We define the Signal-to-Noise
Ratio (SNR) to be
SNR = 10 log10
(
tr(HΣXXHT)
Mσ2
)
. (27)
As a result, the utility function is a function of the correlation
strength ρ and the SNR at which the grid operates.
The performance of the optimal attack as measured by
of the utility function given by (14) is shown in Fig. 1.
Surprisingly, the performance of the attack is non-monotonic
with the correlation strength ρ. Note that the maximum value
of the utility function, i.e. the worst performance of the attack
vector, is represented by a star. The simulations show that
higher values of SNR yield worse performance for the attacker.
Moreover, the performance of the attack is insensitive to the
correlation strength, ρ, for a wide range of correlation values
and only becomes significant when the correlation strength
is large. For low and medium range values of the SNR, the
performance of the attack is governed by the SNR and the
correlation strength does not play a significant role. In the
high SNR regime, the performance of the attack does not
change significantly with the value of the correlation strength.
This observation contrasts with linearly encoded Gaussian
communication systems in which the impact of correlation is
significant even for the cases in which the correlation strength
is low [26].
The tradeoff between the disruption and the probability
of attack detection is shown in Fig. 2. The performance of
the attack is analyzed in terms of the mutual information,
I(XN ;YMA ), and the KL divergence, D(PYMA ||PYM ), that
the attack induces. Interestingly, the performance of both
objectives of the utility function is similar and there is no
significant difference in the effect of the SNR or the correlation
strength. This suggests that the tradeoff between disruption
and detection achieved by the optimal attack construction does
not change significantly with different system parameters. It
is only when the value of the correlation strength is high that
the performance gain obtained in terms of mutual information
grows faster than the performance gain obtained from the KL
divergence improvement. From a practical point of view, this
suggests that the attacker expects to inflict a similar disruption
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Fig. 1. Performance of the optimal attack in terms of the utility
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Fig. 2. Performance of the optimal attack in terms of the
mutual information (MI) and the KL divergence for different
values of SNR in the IEEE 30-Bus test system.
on the grid for a given probability of detection regardless of
the system parameters ρ and SNR.
In the following, the performance of the optimal attack
construction is numerically evaluated when imperfect second
order statistics are available to the attacker. In particular, the
sample covariance matrix estimate discussed in Section IV is
used to assess the performance of the attack when limited
training data is available. The performance of the attack using
a sample covariance matrix when SNR=10 dB and SNR=20
dB is shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, respectively.
Therein, the dashed lines depict the performance of the
optimal attack when the real covariance matrix is known,
while the solid lines depict the performance of the attack
constructed with the sample covariance matrix obtained with a
limited number of training samples. To guarantee the positive
definiteness of SXX , the number of samples is larger than
the size of SXX . For each point, 100 realizations of the
sample covariance are obtained and the utility function value
is averaged over these realizations.
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Fig. 3. Performance of the optimal attack for different sizes
of the training set and different values of correlation strength
when SNR = 10 dB in the IEEE 30-Bus test system.
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Fig. 4. Performance of the optimal attack for different sizes
of the training set and different values of correlation strength
when SNR = 20 dB in the IEEE 30-Bus test system
Interestingly, the convergence speed changes significantly
for different values of the correlation strength. The conver-
gence is faster for lower values of the correlation strength
while the impact of the SNR is not significant. This suggests
that although the performance of the optimal attack does not
change significantly with respect to the correlation strength
when perfect second order statistics are available, in a more
realistic setting a low correlation between the state variables
provides an advantageous situation for the attacker.
Fig. 5 shows the normalized Frobenius norm between the
attack when a sample covariance matrix is used and the
optimal attack with perfect second order statistics of the state
variable, i.e. ||Σ
?
AA−ΣA˜A˜||F
||Σ?AA||F
. The difference between the attack
using the sample covariance matrix and the optimal covariance
matrix decreases with the number of samples. This implies
that the attack using the sample covariance matrix converges
asymptotically to the optimal covariance matrix. However,
different values of the correlation strength ρ result in different
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Fig. 5. Normalized Frobenius norm of the difference between
the attack using sample covariance matrix and the optimal
attack on IEEE 30-Bus system
convergence speeds. Fig. 1 shows that when SNR = 10 dB,
the performance of the optimal attack when ρ = 0.1 and
ρ = 0.8 is almost the same. Similarly to what is observed
with the utility functions, Fig. 5 shows that larger values of
ρ converge more slowly, and as a result, the attacker needs a
larger set of training samples to obtain the same performance.
Ultimately there is a trade-off between the performance of
the attack and the correlation strength ρ governing the state
variables. On one hand, larger correlation strength yields better
attack performance. On the other hand, larger correlation
strength requires more training samples which implies the
attack statistics are more difficult to learn.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a stealthy attack construction strategy
within a Bayesiam framework for the smart grid. The proposed
attack construction maximizes the disruption on the state
estimation that the operator obtains while minimizing the
probability of attack detection. Information-theoretic measures
have been used to model the utility function for the attack
construction. Specfically, the disruption has been captured by
the mutual information between the state variables and the
compromised measurements, while the probability of detection
has been incorporated via the KL divergence between the
distributions of the measurements with and without an attack.
The resulting optimization problem has been shown to be
convex and closed form expressions have been obtained. The
performance of the optimal attack construction has been nu-
merically evaluated in an IEEE 30-Bus test system. The impact
of imperfect statistical knowledge about the state variables has
also been assessed via simulations for the case in which the
attacker uses a sample covariance matrix. It has been observed
that the correlation between state variables plays a critical role
in the performance of the attack when limited training samples
are available to the attacker.
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